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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ADMINISTRATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOL
BY MUNICIPAL TRUSTEE CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION-CY PRES
Penn.3ylvanak v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957)
Stephen Girard died testate in 1831. The residue of his vast estate
was bequeathed to the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Philadelphia,'
their successors and assigns in trust, to erect and maintain a college
for the education and support of poor, white, male, orphan children,
between the ages of six and ten years. The college was built accord-
ing to the elaborate instructions of the testator,2 opened in 1848,3 and
since 1869 has operated continuously under the administration of the
Board of Directors of City Trusts.4 In 1955 a petition was brought in
behalf of two negro orphan boys, whose applications admittedly had
been denied solely on grounds of color, to compel the Board to grant
them admission to the college. The action of the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia in refusing to order the requested relief was affirmed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.- The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed the decree of the Pennsylvania court on the ground
that the Board's action as trustee of Girard College constituted dis-
crimination by the state, proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment6
1. This was the corporate name of the city under the act of March 11, 1789.
P.k. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 16252 (1957). This name was subsequently changed on
Feb. 2, 1854, to "The City of Philadelphia." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 16251( 1 ,-57 ).
". The testator had carefully planned the construction and furnishing of the
college to the most minute detail, including descriptions of the proposed location
of the school, diensions of the main building, materials to be used in construe-
tion, the manner in which the building was to be erected, the type of instructors
to be employed, the general curriculum to be taught, the method of selecting
applicarnts according to geographical location, and the dress and diet to be ob-
served by the orphans who were admitted. See Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43
U.S. 127, 130-32 (1844).
:3- The statement in the orphans' court opinion (4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671, 677 5
Fid. Rep,. 449, 455) to the effect that the college opened in 1858 is in error. ee
1( ENc. BRIT. 366 (14th ed. 1937).
41. The Board of Directors of City Trusts was established in 1869 by the state
legislature to take charge of and administer all property dedicated to charitable
trusts, that was previously, or might thereafter become, vested in the City of
Philadelphia. See PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, §§ 16365-70 (1957). (The Supreme
Court, in referring to the Board of Trusts, cited Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., 1957,
Tit. 5%, § 1365 (now § 1340) 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957). This citation, however,
does not deal with the subject matter, and it is believed that the Supreme Court
intended reference to the former citation oupra.)
5. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).
i. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
Whether charitable trusts are by nature vulnerable to charges of state action,
due to the responsibility of the attorney general to supervise their administration,
is heyond the scope of this comment. For discussion of this point, and other prob-
lems raised by the Girard case, see Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth
Anwndrntt and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.. 979 (1957). (This
article arrived too late for use in preparation of this comment.)
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The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to action
by a state, not to action by an individual.7 The state can act through
the exercise of its legislative, executive, or judicial powers,8 or
through the medium of an individual acting wilfully under color of
state authority.9 The state also can act when it allows groups of
private individuals to conduct activities or perform services that pro-
mote (or hinder) purposes deemed to be a function or responsibility
of government. 0 And lastly, if the state attempts to sponsor or fi-
nance private activities, or undertakes supervision of private organi-
zations, this may be deemed sufficient to constitute state action.1
The issue squarely presented to the Supreme Court in the principal
case was whether the action of the Board, as trustee of the orphan
asylum, amounted to state denial of equal protection of the laws to
negro orphan boys.'12 If the Board as trustee acted strictly in a func-
tional capacity, administering the college in accordance with the
terms of the trust, any discrimination exhibited by the testator in
selecting beneficiaries of his generosity would not of itself raise a
constitutional question.13 If, however, the Board's legal position be-
came that of actively assisting the testator to perpetuate discrimina-
tory dispositions, this supervisory control would be unlawful under
the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the Board was acting only
as a fiduciary. 4 In other words, the liberty of an individual to dispose
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
318 (1879).
8. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879).
9. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States,
325 U. S. 91 (1945) ; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But see Note,
96 U. PA. L. REV. 402, 406 (1948).
10. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Nicholson, The Legal Standing of
the Soutls School Resistance Proposals, 7 S.C.L.Q. 1, 42 (1954); accord, Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
11. See Nicholson, supra note 10, at 27, 35.
12. See 386 Pa. at 558, 127 A.2d at 289-90.
13. This was the argument accepted by the Pennsylvania courts in upholding
the validity of the trust. It was emphasized that defendant Board of City Trusts
was an entity separate and apart from the city, which, acting through the mayor
and the Commission on Human Relations, was a party plaintiff to the suit. The
position of the Board was likened to a private individual or trust company,
exercising no sovereign powers, whose sole and exclusive function as a fiduciary
was faithfully to execute the directions of the testator. See 386 Pa. at 560-61,
585-87 (concurring opinion), 599-602 (concurring opinion), 127 A.2d at 293,
304-05, 311-12; 4 Pa. D. & C.2d at 701, 717-19, 5 Fid. Rep. at 483. See also text
at note 7 supra.
It appears from the Supreme Court opinion, however, that the city, represented
by the Board, is unable to serve merely in a fiduciary capacity unless it totally
abstains from action, due to the fact that it is a municipality-an instrumentality
of the state. Whenever it acts, the state also is acting.
14. "Certainly a testator is entitled to choose the beneficiaries of his bounty,
but if he asks the government to administer his estate he cannot expect the gov-
ernment to ignore the very law it symbolizes." 386 Pa. at 628, 127 A.2d at 324
(dissenting opinion). "[N]o testator has the right to ask the government to do
something wlich is prohibited by the Constitution." Id. at 640, 127 A.2d at 330(dissenting opinion). See also text at note 11 supra.
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freely of his property does not include the unrestricted privilege of
calling upon the government to administer his gift.'
Supporting the view that administration of the college by the
Board constituted state action are the facts that: the creation of the
college required the assistance of the state legislature to pass neces-
sary enabling provisions ;- the Board of Directors of City Trusts was
itself a creature of the state, formed to act as agents for the City of
Philadelphia ;1 periodical reports on the operation of the college must
be submitted to the Pennsylvania legislature and to the city councils ;"s
the accounts of the college are subject to the state's power of visita-
tion; and the college enjoys a tax exemption amounting to $550,700
annually."', Furthermore, the bequest made to the city, while effectu-
ating the private desires of the testator, simultaneously fulfills a
public charitable purpose-" of providing education and support for
I5. "If a testator should today leave his property in trust to the State for the
tUaining of destructive atom bomb engineers, and then later on the destructive
at,m bomb should be proscribed, the government could not be compelled to go on
instructing students in a sphere of education beyond the pale of the law." 386
Pa. at 628, 127 A.2d at 324 (dissenting opinion).
,,at s. id. at 61:3, 127 A.2d at 318 (concurring opinion), where it is stated:
"it follows logically and necessarily that if an individual cannot constitu-
tionally leave his money to an orphanage or to a private home and college
for Ioor white male orphans, he cannot constitutionally leave his money to a
Catholic, or Episcopal, or Baptist, or 'Methodist, or Lutheran or Presby-
tei ian Church; or to a Synagogue for Orthodox Jews; or to a named Cath-
olic Church or to a named Catholic priest for masses for the repose of his
roul, or for other religious or charitable purposes."
16. By an act of March 24, 1832, P.L. 176, the legislature authorized the city
-to exercise all such jurisdiction, enact all such ordinances, and do and execute
all such acts and things whatsoever as may be necessary and convenient for the
full and entire acceptance, execution, and prosecution of any and all the devises
and bequests, trusts and provisions contained in the said [Girard] will .... " A
second act of April 4, 18.32, P.L. 275, authorized the city councils (common and
select) "to provide by ordinance or otherwise, for the election or appointment of
such officers and agents as they may deem essential to the due execution of the
duties and trusts enjoined and created by will of the late Stephen Girard."
Various other provisions relating to the college were subsequently enacted, both
by the state legislature and the city councils, for promoting its successful opera-
tion. See 386 Pa. at 621-22, 127 A.2d at 321-22 (dissenting opinion).
17. The Board, when it was created in 1869, consisted of fifteen members, in-
cluding the mayor, the presidents of the select and common councils, and twelve
other citizens. The twelve citizens are now appointed by the board of judges of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53,
§§ 16365-66, 16370 (1957); note 4, supra. For the present composition of the
Boald, see :386 Pa. at 585, 127 A.2d at 304 (concurring opinion).
18. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 16368 (1957).
11. See :386 Pa. at 62:3-25, 127 A.2d at 322-23 (dissenting opinion).
20. See id. at 644, 127 A.2d at 333. Financial support through tax exemption
can be one factor in favor of a finding that a state has aided a private school to
continue discriminatory practices. Nicholson, supra note 10, at 35. However, no
rigid rule of equality has yet been imposed upon states in selecting subjects of
tax exemption, and hence tax exemption alone may be insufficient to constitute
state action. Id. at 37-39.
21. The public character of the trust was pointed out in Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 43 U.S. 127, 186-90 (1844), and was used by the Court as a basis for
allowing the city to hold and administer the trust estate. See also Franklin's
Estate, 150 Pa. 437, 449, 24 Atl. 626, 627 (1892); Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa.
169, 181-82 (1870); 4 SCOTT, TRusTs § 348, at 2551 (2d ed. 1956).
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orphan children who otherwise are potential wards of the state. Con-
sidering this last fact together with a recent statement of the Supreme
Court that education in a democratic society is possibly the most
important function of state and local government,2 2 the decision in
the principal case is neither surprising nor unprecedented. 23
Now that the case has been remanded for further proceedings,
proper authorities must decide whether a new trustee should be se-
lected to administer the college, and whether the word "white" should
be deleted from the testator's will. The orphans' court considered
these problems in the reverse order, and intimated that if the word
"white" were deleted, the court should appoint a new trustee.24 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in dictum, took thq view that if the
Board's activities constituted state action, a new trustee should be
appointed.2 5 If the opinion of the latter court prevails, it will be un-
necessary to consider whether negroes must be admitted to the col-
lege, particularly since the testator's intent can be effectuated by a
private trustee26 without enlarging the class of beneficiaries-that is,
without resorting to the doctrine of cy pres.2 7 This, however, circum-
vents the serious question whether the present trustee can be replaced
without vitalizing the limitation of the trust res over to the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, should the city ever knowingly and wilfully
violate the terms of the trust.28  It also skirts the further question
whether the commonwealth, which as remainderman joined in the
petition against the Board, has aided and promoted such knowing and
22. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Malone
v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 223-24, 197 Atl. 344, 352 (1938).
23. As might be expected however, there is contrary opinion on this matter.
See, e.g., Lawrence, Girard 6 ollege Case, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 4, 1957,
p. 6A, col. 6.
24. 4 Pa. D. & C.2d at 701-02, 5 Fid. Rep. at 483-84. It would seem, however,
that removing "white" from the will would eliminate any necessity for appoint-
ing a new trustee, since there would no longer be any discriminatory action. Only
if the trust became repugnant to the purposes of the public corporation admin-
istering it, e.g., required unconstitutional discrimination, would a new trustee be
needed. See authorities in note 21 supra.
25. 386 Pa. at 566, 127 A.2d at 295.
26. This is of course, assuming that the appointment of a private trustee
would be valid. See text at notes 28, 31 infra.
27. The doctrine of cy pres is a "salvaging device," by which a court can apply
assets devoted to a specific charitable purpose to another similar purpose, when
the first trust cannot further be executed according to the intent of the settlor.
Before this doctrine can be used, however, there must be: (1) a valid charitable
trust, (2) an impossibility or impracticality of continuing the trust expressly in
accordance with its initial terms, and (3) an expression by the settlor of a gen-
eral charitable intent sufficiently broad to permit a court to divert the trust
assets to the proposed new use. See 4 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 587 (1954).
28. If the city ever wilfully and knowingly violates any conditions included in
the will, the testator directed that the remainder and accumulations, excepting
rents, issues, and profits from certain real estate, go to the state for purposes of
internal navigation. See Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127, 135 (1884).
Whether disability of the city to act as trustee, and appointment of a substitute
trustee, would constitute a wilful and knowing violation is not known. 4 Pa. D. &
C.2d at 702, 5 Fid. Rep. at 484.
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wilful violation, thereby possibly causing the second forfeiture, over
to the United States, to operate.-'
From the foregoing, it seems that the orphans' court must choose
one of two basic alternatives in disposing of the case: it must either
order the word "white" deleted from the will and retain the Board as
trustee of the college, or leave the will unchanged except for appoint-
ment of a new trustee. ', If the latter course is adopted there is dan-
ger that a higher court will hold (1) that the trust is still sufficiently
public, notwithstanding appointment of a private trustee, to constitute
state action,," or (2) that discontinuance of the city as trustee of the
college actuates the forfeiture provision, regardless of the reason for
such discontinuance. - The first choice, although in a narrow sense it
more radically departs from the express intent of the testator, pro-
vides greater assurance of continuing the college free from further
attack, and also enables the city to retain its supervisory control over
an institution that unquestionably performs a vital public service.
The difficulty with this choice, however, is finding a charitable intent
sufficiently broad to justify a court in placing the testator's specific
21. The testator directed that should the commonwealth fail to apply his be-quests to the purposes mentioned in his will, the remainder and accumulations
of the estate, with certain exceptions, were to accrue to the United States for
Pimoros of internal navigation. See Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127,1:5 (1884); note 28 supra.
:"0. Of course, there also is the third possibility of forfeiting the $98,000,000
t ust res to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
"I. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); of. Terry v.Adams, :45 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946);Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1877). See also text at notes 16-23 supra.
Rlaf 'f. Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 465, 218 S.W.2d 30 (1949).
:32. See note 28 supra. There is opportunity for argument, moreover, that the
testator expressly did not want a private trustee to administer his college. This
cnclusion could be drawn from the methodical care with which the testator haddrafted his will (see note 2 .supra) plus the fact that all potential recipients of
the remainder and accumulations of the estate were governmental bodies (see
n oftu, 28-29 supra). See also 386 Pa. at 639, 127 A.2d at 330 (dissenting opinion).
Various collateral issues would be presented by an attempted transfer of theproperty into the hands of a pivate trustee. Some of them are: (1) Under whatlegal proceedings would a new trustee be appointed? (a) Could the orphans'
coLut appoint a new trustee sua sponte? (b) If not, would anyone other than
the commnonwealth have legal standing to request such action? (c) Could the
commnionwealth litigate such a motion without prejudicing its interests as re-
mainde, man? (2) Who could contest a transfer of the property by the city? (a)Would a negro orphan have legal standing to upset a voidable, as contrasted to
an entji ely void, transfer of assets? (b) Would a local taxpayer be deemed tohave sufficient interest in this privately endowed trust to question the transfer
of city-owned assets? (c) Would surviving heirs or relatives of the testator have
standing to test the validity of any transfer? (d) Would the commonwealth,
through its attorney general, question the transfer either as a matter of a civicduty or for purposes of promoting a forfeiture of the trust res? (3) Would ap-pointment by a court of a new trustee be res judicata in a subsequent suit
contesting such appointment? (a) Could the city represent all orphan children
who might subsequently bring suit? (b) Would representation of such orphansby the city raise a problem of conflict-of-interests?
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desire to assist "white" orphans subordinate to a general desire to
help indigent orphans regardless of race.33
It is submitted that, of the two available alternatives, selection of
the one deleting the word "white" from the will and retaining the
present trustee as administrator of the college would be the better
choice. First of all, there is language in the testator's will that easily
could be interpreted as expressing a general intent to educate poor
people, irrespective of their race or color,34 thus making the doctrine
of cy pres available to the court.35 Further, given the changing politi-
cal and social conditions realized under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 86 there is some reason to suppose that deletion of
"white" from the will would not be contra7j to the intent of the
testator.37 Finally, since administration of the college can no longer
lawfully continue as in the past, there is much reason to believe that
the primary intent of the testator would be to keep the school operat-
ing, free from further obstructions, as nearly in accordance with the
previous mode of operation as possible.38
CRIMINAL LAW: PROOF OF INTENT UNDER BURGLARY TOOL STATUTES
Benton v. United States, 282 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
Following a search of defendant's car which yielded a burlap bag
containing an axe, a sledge hammer, a chisel, a brace and bit, a hack-
saw and four blades, twenty-five feet of rope, and two wrecking bars,
defendant was convicted of possessing implements which "may rea-
sonably be employed in the commission of any crime."1 The pertinent
part of the applicable statute provides that "no one shall have in his
possession in the District any instrument, tool or other implement for
picking locks or pockets, or that is usually employed or reasonably
33. See note 27 supra.
34. "I have been for a long time impressed with the importance of educating
the poor, and of placing them, by the early cultivation of their minds and the
development of their moral principles, above the many temptations, to which,
through poverty and ignorance they are exposed .... I have sincerely at heart
the welfare of the city of Philadelphia . . . ." Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43
U.S. 127, 129 (1884). See also Attorney-General v. Price, [1912] 1 Ch. 667
(C.A.). But see Craft v. Shroyer, 81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947).
35. But see 386 Pa. at 569, 127 A.2d at 297.
36. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865 and the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, respectively thirty-five and thirty-eight years after the
testator's will was drawn.
37. There is reason to believe that a man of such philanthropy and truly
human generosity as was Stephen Girard, who devoted almost his entire fortune
to promoting public works and alleviating human suffering, would place himself
beyond any barriers of color. See 386 Pa. at 617-18, 127 A.2d at 319-20 (dissent-
ing opinion). See also note 34 supra. But see 386 Pa. at 577-78, 127 A.2d at 300-
01 (concurring opinion).
38. See 386 Pa. at 568, 127 A.2d at 296.
1. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-3601 (Supp. 1951).
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